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Abstract
The House Allocation problem, the Stable Marriage problem and the
Stable Roommates problem are three fundamental problems in the area of
matching under preferences. These problems have been studied for decades
under a range of optimality criteria, but despite much progress, some chal-
lenging questions remain open. The purpose of this article is to present a
range of key open questions for each of these problems, which will hope-
fully stimulate further research activity in this area.
1 Introduction
Matching markets involve allocating a set of agents to a set of resources (e.g.,
pupils to schools, students to projects), or allocating one set of agents to a di↵erent
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set of agents (e.g., school leavers to universities, junior doctors to hospitals), or
allocating a set of agents to one another (e.g., forming teams for groupwork).
Typically agents declare which other agents / resources they find acceptable, and
may rank their acceptable potential matches in order of preference.
Matching problems involving ordinal preferences over outcomes have received
a great deal of attention in the literature from computer scientists, mathematicians
and economists, as evidenced by a range of research monographs on the topic
spanning these disciplines [58, 42, 86, 65]. The study of these problems dates
back to the seminal paper of Gale and Shapley [36], whose e cient algorithm
for the so-called Stable Marriage problem, known as the Gale–Shapley algorithm
(or the Deferred Acceptance mechanism), has been deployed in many real-world
matching markets [19].
One of the earliest practical applications of the Gale–Shapley algorithm was in
the allocation of graduating medical students to their first posts as junior doctors in
US hospitals [82]. This algorithm has been used as part of the National Resident
Matching Program (NRMP) since 1952, thus predating Gale and Shapley’s paper
by 10 years [86]. Nowadays, over 40,000 applicants to the NRMP are handled by
an extension of the Gale–Shapley algorithm [75].
Other practical settings where algorithms are deployed to clear matching mar-
kets include [19]:
• school placement in Boston [1, 3] and New York [2]
• higher education admission in China [99, 100], Germany [21] and Hungary
[20];
• university faculty recruitment in France [15, 16];
• placing military cadets in branches [92];
• assigning kidney patients to donors through kidney exchanges [83, 84, 85];
• allocating students to projects in a university department [7, 29].
Some of these markets are very large (for example, in China, over 10 million
students apply for admission to higher education annually through a centralised
process [99]) and thus it is of paramount importance that the clearing algorithms
are e cient. Moreover, the outcomes for the agents involved may impact heav-
ily on their quality of life, which motivates the design of algorithms producing
matchings that are optimal in a precise sense according to the agents’ preferences.
The importance of this research area was recognised in 2012 through the award
of the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences to Al Roth and Lloyd Shapley “for the
theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design” [76]. This has
sparked renewed interest in matching problems: subsequently several book chap-
ters on the topic have been published [57, 19, 30, 22], another edited volume is in
progress [34], and the second edition of the Encyclopedia of Algorithms [54] in-
cludes many entries that survey algorithms for matching problems. See also [23]
for a very recent survey. As far as meetings are concerned, the International Work-
shop on Matching Under Preferences (MATCH-UP) continues to flourish [67], es-
tablished conferences such as COMSOC, EC, ICALP, IJCAI, SAGT, SODA and
WINE have included many papers on matching problems in recent years, and in
July 2020 the first Dagstuhl seminar entirely devoted to matching under prefer-
ences will take place [89].
The time is right, therefore, for an updated list of some of the key open prob-
lems in matching under preferences. Twelve open problems in this area were pre-
sented by Gusfield and Irving [42], and updates on these were given by Manlove
[65], who in turn posed a number of additional open questions on related prob-
lems. The purpose of this article is to select some of the problems from [42] and
[65] that are still open, giving updates on progress to date, and to describe some
new open problems of the authors’ choosing.
We categorise matching problems involving preferences according to whether
the market is (i) bipartite or (ii) non-bipartite. Further, those problems in category
(i) can be further classified according to whether the market involves (a) a set of
agents and a set of resources (so agents have preferences over resources, but not
vice-versa) or (b) two disjoint sets of agents, where each agent from one set has
preferences over a subset of agents from the other set. The archetypal problem in
class (i)(a) is called the House Allocation problem [47, 101, 4] in view of its ap-
plication to campus housing allocation in universities [24, 78]. The fundamental
problem in class (i)(b) is the Stable Marriage problem [36, 42], which has applica-
tions to junior doctor allocation [82] and higher education admission [20]. Finally
the key problem in class (ii) is the Stable Roommates problem [48, 42] which has
applications to P2P networking [62], and team allocation, for example in chess
tournaments [59].
We present open questions relating to each of these fundamental problems.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide
formal definitions of the problems and solution concepts studied in this article.
Then in Section 3 we present open questions relating to the House Allocation
problem, the Stable Marriage problem and the Stable Roommates problem.
2 Problem definitions
2.1 House Allocation problem
An instance I of the House Allocation problem (ha), also known as the Assign-
ment problem, comprises a set A = {a1, a2, . . . , an1} of applicants and a set H =
{h1, h2, . . . , hn2} of houses. There is a set E ✓ A⇥H of acceptable applicant–house
pairs. Let m = |E|. Each applicant ai 2 A has an acceptable set of houses A(ai),
where A(ai) = {hj 2 H : (ai, hj) 2 E}. Similarly each house hj 2 H has an
acceptable set of applicants A(hj), where A(hj) = {ai 2 A : (ai, hj) 2 E}.
Each applicant ai 2 A has a preference list which is a strict linear order  ai
over A(ai).1 Given an applicant ai 2 A, and given two houses hj, hk 2 A(ai), ai is
said to prefer h j to hk if hj  ai hk. For a given acceptable applicant–house pair
(ai, hj), define rank(ai, hj) to be 1 plus the number of houses that ai prefers to hj.
An assignment M is a subset of E. If (ai, hj) 2 M, ai and hj are said to be
assigned to one another. For each pk 2 A [ H, the set of assignees of pk in
M is denoted by M(pk). If M(pk) = ;, pk is said to be unassigned, otherwise
pk is assigned. A matching M is an assignment such that |M(pk)|  1 for each
pk 2 A[H. For notational convenience, if pk is assigned in M then where there is
no ambiguity the notation M(pk) is also used to refer to the single member of the
set M(pk). LetM denote the set of matchings in I.
The preferences of an applicant extend toM as follows. Given two matchings
M,M0 2 M, we say that an applicant ai 2 A prefers M0 to M if either (i) ai is
assigned in M0 and unassigned in M, or (ii) ai is assigned in both M and M0, and
ai prefers M0(ai) to M(ai).
Given this definition, we may define a relation / on M as follows: if M,M0 2
M then M0 /M if no applicant prefers M to M0, and some applicant prefers M0 to
M. If M0 / M then M0 is called a Pareto improvement of M. It is straightforward
to establish that / is a partial order on M. A matching M 2 M is defined to be
Pareto optimal if M is /-minimal. Equivalently, M is Pareto optimal if and only if
there is no other matching M0 in I such that (i) some applicant prefers M0 to M,
and (ii) no applicant prefers M to M0.
Another optimality criterion for an ha instance I is popularity. Let M,M0 2
M, and let P(M,M0) denote the set of applicants who prefer M to M0. Define a
“more popular than” relation J on M as follows: if M,M0 2 M, then M0 is more
popular than M, denoted M0 J M, if |P(M0,M)| > |P(M,M0)|. (Note that J is not
in general a transitive relation onM.) Define a matching M 2 M to be popular if
M is J-minimal (i.e., there is no other matching M0 such that M0 J M). Thus, put
simply, M is popular if there is no other matching that is preferred by a majority
of the applicants who are not indi↵erent between the two matchings.
A further notion of optimality is based on the profile of a matching. Given a
matching M 2 M, define the degree of M, denoted d(M), to be the maximum rank
of an applicant’s partner in M. Formally define
d(M) = max{rank(ai, hj) : (ai, hj) 2 M}.
1That is,  ai is an irreflexive, transitive and linear binary relation over A(ai).
The profile of M, denoted by p(M), is a vector hp1, . . . , pdi, where d = d(M) and
for each k (1  k  d),
pk = |{(ai, hj) 2 M : rank(ai, hj) = k}|.
Intuitively, pk is the number of applicants who have their kth-choice house in M.
A matching M is rank-maximal if p(M) is lexicographically maximum, taken
over all matchings in M. Intuitively, in such a matching, the maximum number
of applicants are assigned to their first-choice house, and subject to this condition,
the maximum number of applicants are assigned to their second-choice house, and
so on.
A natural extension of ha arises when applicants are permitted to have ties in
their preference lists – in this case each applicant ai 2 A now has a weak linear
order  ai over A(ai).2 This gives rise to the House Allocation problem with Ties
(hat). In this case each of the definitions of a Pareto optimal, popular and rank-
maximal matching, as defined above for the ha case, carry over to hat without
alteration.
2.2 Stable Marriage problem
The Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete lists (smi) can be regarded as a
variant of ha in which houses have preferences over applicants. In the smi context,
applicants and houses are more commonly referred to as men and women respec-
tively. Formally, an instance I of smi comprises a set U = {m1,m2, . . . ,mn1} of
men and a set W = {w1,w2, . . . ,wn2} of women. The definitions of E, acceptable
man–woman pairs, m, A(mi) and A(wj) for each mi 2 U and wj 2 W are analogous
to the ha case.
For each mi 2 U, the definitions of preference list, prefer and rank are anal-
ogous to the ha case. Additionally, each woman wj 2 W has a preference list in
which she ranks A(wj) in strict order. The definitions of prefer and rank for wj are
analogous to the definitions for the men. Likewise, the definitions of assignment,
assigned to, M(pk) for any pk 2 U [ W, assigned, unassigned and matching are
analogous to the ha case.
A blocking pair of matching M in I is a man–woman pair (mi,wj) 2 E such
that mi is unmatched or prefers wj to M(mi), and wj is unmatched or prefers mi to
M(wj). Matching M is stable if it admits no blocking pair.
The Stable Marriage problem (sm) is the special case of smi in which n1 = n2
and E = U⇥W. We refer to n = n1 = n2 as the size of the given instance I, and it is
2That is,  ai is a reflexive, transitive and linear binary relation over A(ai). Given two houses
h j, hk 2 A(ai), ai is said to prefer h j to hk if h j  ai hk and hk  ai h j, whilst ai is said to be indi↵erent
between h j and hk if h j  ai hk and hk  ai h j; in the latter case, h j and hk are said to belong to a tie
in ai’s list.
assumed that any matching M in I has size n. When preference lists may include
ties, each of sm and smi may be generalised to the Stable Marriage problem with
Ties (smt) and the Stable Marriage problem with Ties and Incomplete lists (smti)
respectively, without modification to the stability definition.
2.3 Stable Roommates problem
The Stable Roommates problem with Incomplete lists (sri) is a non-bipartite gen-
eralisation of smi. An instance I of sri comprises a set A = {a1, a2, . . . , an} of
agents. We refer to n as the size of I. There is a set E ✓ {X ✓ A : |X| = 2} of
acceptable agent pairs. The definitions of m and A(ai) for each ai 2 A are anal-
ogous to the ha case. For each ai 2 A, the definitions of preference list, prefer
and rank are also analogous to the ha case. Likewise, the definitions of assign-
ment, assigned to, M(ai) for any ai 2 A, assigned, unassigned and matching are
analogous to the ha case.
A blocking pair of matching M in I is a pair of agents {ai, aj} 2 E such that ai
is unmatched or prefers aj to M(ai), and aj is unmatched or prefers ai to M(aj).
Matching M is stable if it admits no blocking pair.
The Stable Roommates problem (sr) is the special case of sri in which |E| =
n(n 1)/2. When preference lists may include ties, each of sr and srimay be gen-
eralised to the Stable Roommates problem with Ties (srt) and the Stable Room-
mates problem with Ties and Incomplete lists (srti) respectively, without modifi-
cation to the stability definition.
3 Open problems
We present open problems relating to ha, sm and sr in Sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3
respectively.
3.1 House Allocation problem
In this section we present open problems relating to the approximability of a
relaxed notion of popular matchings called “least unpopular matchings” in ha
(Section 3.1.1), popular and rank-maximal matchings under three models of un-
certainty in applicants’ preferences (Section 3.1.2), and finally ha organised via
house exchanges in a so-called social network (Section 3.1.3).
a1 : h1 h2
a2 : h1 h2
a3 : h1 h2
a1
a2
a3
h1
h2
1
2
1
2
1
2
Figure 1: No popular matching exists in this instance. The lists on the left and the
numbers on the edges in the figure on the right are the preferences of each appli-
cant. All applicants prefer h1 to h2. The dotted gray matching {(a2, h1), (a3, h2)}
is more popular than the dashed gray matching {(a1, h1), (a2, h2)}, because both a2
and a3 prefer it. Similarly, the black matching {(a1, h2), (a3, h1)} defeats the dotted
gray, and the dashed gray defeats the black.
3.1.1 Approximability of least unpopular matchings
In ha, the existence of a popular matching is not guaranteed. Figure 1 depicts an
instance equivalent to the famous voting paradox of Condorcet [28], where none
of the matchings is popular. In this context, the following result answers the most
striking algorithmic question of the topic.
Theorem 1 ([6]). There is algorithm that outputs either a (largest cardinality)
popular matching or a proof for its nonexistence. For hat, the algorithm runs in
O(
p
nm) time, which is reduced to O(n + m) for ha.
Having established in Theorem 1 that we can distinguish between instances
with and without popular matchings in polynomial time, the relaxation of popu-
larity is the next intuitive move.
First, the notion of least unpopular matchings was proposed to deal with in-
stances that have no popular matchings [68]. Assume that M1 and M2 are two
matchings in the same instance. We say that M2 dominates M1 by a factor of uv ,
if |P(M2,M1)| = u and |P(M1,M2)| = v. To be precise, this factor is uv if v , 0,
it is 1 if u = v = 0, and it is 1 if v = 0 and u > 0. For instance, match-
ing {(a2, h1), (a3, h2)} in Figure 1 dominates matching {(a1, h1), (a2, h2)} by a factor
of 2. The unpopularity factor of a matching M is the maximum factor by which
it is dominated by any other matching. According to this definition, a matching is
popular if and only if its unpopularity factor is exactly 1.
McCutchen [68] also defined an alternative concept to measure the degree of
popularity, called the unpopularity margin. Using the same u and v as above, M2
dominates M1 by a margin of u   v, instead of uv . Returning to the same example
in Figure 1, we can state that {(a2, h1), (a3, h2)} dominates {(a1, h1), (a2, h2)} by a
margin of 1. The unpopularity margin of M is the maximum margin by which M
is dominated by any other matching. According to this definition, a matching is
popular if and only if its unpopularity margin is exactly 0.
Theorem 2 ([68], [65]). For hat, there is an O(m
p
n) time algorithm to find the
unpopularity factor of a matching and there is an O(m
p
n · log n) time algorithm
to find the unpopularity margin of a matching.
Theorem 3 ([68]). Each of the problems of finding a least unpopularity factor
matching and a least unpopularity margin matching is NP-hard in ha. Also, there
is no approximation algorithm for the problem of finding a least unpopularity
factor matching in a given ha instance with performance guarantee 32   ", for any
" > 0, unless P=NP.
Huang et al. [45] presented a polynomial-time iterative algorithm for finding
a matching with low unpopularity factor or margin in random instances. It con-
structs a sequence of k graphs such that the original instance admits a popular
matching with unpopularity factor at most k   1 and unpopularity margin at most
n1
⇣
1   2k
⌘
if the k-th graph in the sequence admits a perfect matching. However,
future work could explore least unpopular matchings further by finding a better
approximation algorithm or proving a tighter inapproximability bound.
3.1.2 Popular and rank-maximal matchings under uncertain preferences
Applicants’ preferences may not be completely known because of a lack of infor-
mation or communication. The reason for an applicant in an hat instance placing
two houses in the same tie might be that she has not gained su ciently detailed in-
formation about these two options to di↵erentiate between them. Also, she might
not be able to receive all the information she requires about each available house,
because it would take too many rounds of communication. However, later the
applicant might refine her preferences, if she gains extra information.
Aziz et al. examined Pareto optimal matchings in variants of ha [14, 11], and
also stable matchings in sm [13] under uncertain preferences. They set up three
di↵erent models to capture the uncertainty of agents. In the lottery model, a prob-
ability distribution over strict preference lists is given for each agent. In the com-
pact indi↵erence model, each agent reports a single, weakly ordered preference
list (i.e., a preference list with ties as in smti). Each complete linear order ex-
tension of this weak order is assumed to be equally likely. Finally, in the joint
probability model, a probability distribution over the possible sets of preference
lists is specified.
Besides other, more restricted problems, the following key computational prob-
lems are formulated.
1. PO / SMProbability: What is the probability that a given matching is Pareto
optimal / stable?
2. PO / SM HighestProbability: Compute a matching with the highest proba-
bility of being Pareto optimal / stable.
We summarise the most important findings from [13, 14, 11] in Table 1.
lottery compact indi↵erence joint probability
PO Probability #P-complete #P-complete polynomial
PO HighestProbability NP-hard NP-hard NP-hard
SM Probability #P-complete ? polynomial
SM HighestProbability ? NP-hard NP-hard
Table 1: The complexity table of the two most central questions (rows) in the three
di↵erent uncertainty models (columns) from [13, 14, 11]. Question marks denote
the open cases.
In another paper [12], similar complexity problems are studied, but instead of
the three uncertainty models, the input has uncertain pairwise preferences. This
means that each agent only expresses a probability of preferring one agent over
another for all possible pairs. If this probability is 0 or 1, then the agent has
expressed certain preferences. In this framework, the complexity of each problem
mainly depends on the transitivity of certain preferences.
One obvious direction forward is to fill the gaps in Table 1. After Pareto
optimal and stable matchings, one might consider to investigate other fairness
notions under uncertain preferences, such as popular or rank-maximal matchings.
3.1.3 House allocation via exchanges in a social network
In a well-studied and realistic variant of ha, each applicant ai initially owns a
house M(ai), and the goal of the applicants is to exchange these houses among
themselves [91]. These exchanges can happen either in a centralised [91, 5, 81,
92, 10] or a decentralised manner [88, 26, 31, 40].
The latter case was studied in a social network by Gourvés et al. [40]. Two
applicants in a social network either know each other, and they are capable of
exchanging their houses, or they do not know each other, in which case no ex-
change can happen. More formally, each applicant ai has an acceptable set A(ai)
of houses, as in the other variants of ha discussed above, but in addition ai has an
acceptable set Aa(ai) of applicants. These Aa(ai) sets trivially define a social net-
work N, which is a graph N = (A, E⇤), where {ai, aj} 2 E⇤ if and only if aj 2 Aa(ai)
and ai 2 Aa(aj). As in the case of ha, applicant ai ranks A(ai), including her initial
endowment, in strict order, and she is only inclined to participate in an exchange
if the house she receives is better than the one she currently owns.
In a social network it can happen that an exchange between applicants ai and
aj that was infeasible earlier becomes feasible later. If aj 2 Aa(ai), and ai finds
M(aj) worse than her own house M(ai), then ai will not accept M(aj) in any fea-
sible exchange. However, if aj participates in an exchange following which she
receives a house M0(aj) that ai ranks higher than her current house, then ai sud-
denly becomes interested in accepting aj’s new house M0(aj).
Gourvés et al. [40] restricted their attention to swaps in social networks. Swaps
are exchanges of length 2, involving two applicants only, who swap their houses
with each other, changing
n
(ai,M(ai)), (aj,M(aj))
o
to
n
(ai,M(aj)), (aj,M(ai))
o
in
the new matching. If a matching M0 is reachable from the initial matching M
by a sequence of such swaps, then we call it a reachable matching. Similarly,
houses that an applicant ai can receive via swaps belong to the set of reachable
houses. Pareto optimal matchings are also defined based on swaps. A matching
M0 is considered to be Pareto optimal if it is reachable from M and there is no
other reachable matching M00 that Pareto-dominates M0. We summarise the main
results from [40] in the following three theorems.
Theorem 4 ([40]). The problem of deciding whether house h j is reachable for
applicant ai is NP-complete even if the network N is a tree. The problem becomes
polynomially solvable if N is a path and ai is a leaf on this path, or when N is a
star.
Theorem 5 ([40]). The problem of deciding whether matching M0 is reachable
from matching M is NP-complete. The problem becomes polynomially solvable if
N is a tree.
Theorem 6 ([40]). The problem of finding a Pareto optimal matching is NP-hard
even if the network N is a tree. The problem becomes polynomially solvable if N
is a star.
Table 2 contains a structured interpretation of the above results.
path star tree general
h reachable polynomial if ai is a leaf polynomial NP-complete NP-complete
M reachable polynomial polynomial polynomial NP-complete
Find PO matching polynomial polynomial NP-complete NP-complete
Table 2: The complexity table summarising the three problems in [40]. The
columns are the type of graph for which we pose the problem in the row, cor-
responding to Theorems 4, 5, and 6, in this order.
The most striking open question regarding exchanges in social networks in-
volves longer cycles instead of swaps only. Strategyproofness is another topic
worthy of investigation. Also, the hard cases in Theorems 4, 5, and 6 could be
tackled from a parameterised complexity viewpoint.
3.2 Stable Marriage problem
In this section we present open problems relating to finding the maximum number
of stable matchings admitted by an sm instance of a given size (Section 3.2.1), de-
termining whether there is a path from an arbitrary matching to a stable matching
in the so-called “divorce digraph” (Section 3.2.2), finding a maximum cardinal-
ity stable matching in an instance of smti (Section 3.2.3) and finally determining
whether there is an e cient algorithm to list all stable matchings in a given in-
stance of smt (Section 3.2.4).
3.2.1 Maximum number of stable matchings
This open problem, first posed by Gusfield and Irving [42], concerns finding the
maximum number xn of stable matchings admitted by any sm instance of size n.
Formally, for a given sm instance I, let SI denote the set of stable matchings in I,
and define
xn = max{|SIn | : In is an sm instance of size n}.
This problem is still open. However some progress has been made, which we now
summarise.
Knuth [58, p.56] and Eilers [35] showed that x4 = 10. More generally, if n is a
power of 2, Irving and Leather [49] and Knuth (personal communication, reported
in [42]) proved that xn > 2.28n/(1 +
p
3) [49, 42]. Thurber [96] showed that xn
is a strictly increasing function of n, and also that xn > 2.28n/(1 +
p
3)(log n+1) for
each n   1.
As far as upper bounds are concerned, Stathopoulos [93] showed that, for each
n   4, xn  n!/2n 3. A major advance was obtained recently by Karlin et al. [55],
who showed that, for each n   1, xn  cn for some constant c (the authors report
that, at the time of writing, c  217). Nevertheless, clearly there remains a large
gap between the best known lower and upper bounds for xn.
3.2.2 Divorce digraph
Let I be an sm instance and let MI be the set of matchings in I. The divorce
digraph of I is a digraph DI = (V, A), where DI contains a vertex for each matching
in MI (so |V | = n!, where n is the size of I), and the edges in DI are defined as
follows. Given two matchings M,M0 inMI , we say that M0 can be obtained from
M by a divorce operation (referred to as a b-interchange in [94]) if
M0 = (M\{(m,M(m)), (M(w),w)}) [ {(m,w), (M(w),M(m))}
for some blocking pair (m,w) of M. (Thus in M0, the man and woman involved
in the blocking pair are matched together, and the “divorcees” are also matched
together.) Given two vertices vM, vM0 in V , corresponding to matchings M and M0
in MI respectively, (vM, vM0) 2 A if and only if M0 can be obtained from M by a
divorce operation. It follows that vM 2 V is a sink vertex of DI if and only if the
corresponding matching M 2 MI is stable. Knuth [58, pp.2–3] showed that DI
could contain cycles. Gusfield and Irving [42] posed the question as to whether,
given an arbitrary matching M0 2 MI , we can always find a path in DI from vM0
to a sink vertex.
Tamura [94] solved this problem by constructing an sm instance I4 and identi-
fying a setM0 ✓ MI4 such that (i) I4 has size 4, (ii) five of the 4! = 24 matchings
in MI4 are stable, (iii) |M0| = 16, and (iv) given any matching M0 2 M0, there is
no path in DI4 from vM0 to a sink vertex. Tan and Su [95] independently solved this
problem by constructing an sm instance I04 of size 4 and a set of stable matchingsM00 in I04 with similar properties (we remark that I04 , I4).
Tamura [94] also gave an algorithm to produce a stable matching from an
initial matching M0 using a combination of divorce operations and an additional
type of step. More formally, he gave an algorithm that traverses a path from vM0
in DI until either the path reaches a sink vertex or it cycles; in the latter case a
matching M00 is constructed such that the set of blocking pairs of M
0
0 is a strict
subset of those of M0. The process repeats from vM00 and eventually we must reach
a stable matching.
Tamura was not able to determine whether this algorithm terminates in poly-
nomial time. Moreover his algorithm might not exclusively use divorce operations
even when there is a path from vM0 to a sink vertex in DI , due to a cycle being tra-
versed in DI instead. This leads to a natural open question, namely to resolve
the complexity of the following decision problem: given an sm instance I and a
matching M0, is there a path in DI from vM0 to a sink vertex?
Note that, if we drop the insistence, as in this subsection, that the “divorcees”
marry one another as part of the divorce operation, then the landscape changes
dramatically — see [87], [65, Section 2.6], and [25] for more details.
3.2.3 Approximability of max smti
Given an instance I of smti, the stable matchings in I can have di↵erent sizes [66],
and max smti, the problem of finding a maximum size stable matching in I, is NP-
hard [52, 66]. This result holds even if, simultaneously, each man’s list is strictly
ordered, each women’s list is either strictly ordered or is a tie of length 2 [66], and
each person’s list is of length at most 3 [50, 71].
The NP-hardness of max smti also holds in the presence of master lists. A
master list L of women (respectively men) is a uniform ranking of all women
(men), possibly involving ties, such that the preference list of each individual man
(woman) is derived from L by deleting his/her unacceptable partners (thus main-
taining the ordering from L over his/her acceptable partners). When the preference
lists on both sides are derived from a master list LU of men and a master list LW
of women, it remains NP-hard to find a maximum size stable matching, and this
remains true even if LU is strictly ordered, whilst either (i) LW contains a single
tie or (ii) each tie in LW is of length 2 [51].
Approximability results for max smti up to 2016 were surveyed in [70, 98]. At
the time of writing those surveys, the best upper bound for the approximability of
unrestricted max smti was 3/2 [69, 56, 77], whilst the best lower bound was 33/29,
even if each tie is of length 2 [97]. This lower bound was improved to 4/3   ",
for any " > 0 (for the same restriction), assuming the Unique Games Conjecture
(UGC) [97]. These upper and lower bounds for general max smti remain the best
known to date, and it is an open problem to close the gap between them.
The 3/2 barrier has been broken for special cases of max smti. For 1s-max
smti, the restriction of max smti in which ties occur in the preference lists on one
side only, the best upper bound up to 2016 reported in [70, 98] was 19/13 [32, 53],
whilst the best lower bound was 21/19 ", for any " > 0, which holds even if each
woman’s list is strictly ordered or is a tie of length 2 [97]. This lower bound was
improved to 5/4  ", for any " > 0 (for the same restriction), assuming UGC [97].
Bauckholt et al. [17] tightened the analysis of an earlier approximation algo-
rithm for 1s-max smti [44] to improve the upper bound derived in [44] from 22/15
to 13/9. Very recently, Lam and Plaxton gave new approximation algorithms that
improved the latter bound to ln 4 ⇡ 1.3863 [60] and then to (1 + 1/e) ⇡ 1.3679
[61]. It is thus an open problem as to whether this latter upper bound can be
reduced to 5/4 in the case of 1s-max smti.
For the special case of 1s-max smti in which each tie occurs at the tail of some
woman’s list, Huang et al. [43] gave an approximation algorithm with perfor-
mance guarantee 5/4, thus matching the known lower bound (assuming UGC).
For the restriction of max smti in which ties can occur on both sides, but each
tie is of length 2, Huang and Kavitha [44] gave an approximation algorithm with
performance guarantee 10/7. A tighter analysis of this approximation algorithm
was given by Chiang and Pashkovich [27], resulting in an improved upper bound
of 4/3. Again, this matches the known lower bound (assuming UGC).
A summary of the lower and upper bounds for the approximability of max
smti and its various restrictions is given in Figure 2. The obvious open problems
correspond to closing the gaps between the lower and upper bounds. Furthermore,
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Figure 2: The figure depicts the gap between the most recent lower and upper
bounds on the approximability in four cases of max smti (assuming UGC). The
unrestricted case is denoted by the dashed blue segment, while the dotted green
segment represents 1s-max smti. A tight approximation algorithm is known for
1s-max smti, if each tie occurs at the end of a list, which is denoted by the black
square. The black triangle denotes the tight approximation for the case with ties
of length at most 2.
it would appear that no existing work on approximation algorithms for max smti
has attempted to utilise the structure that master lists give rise to, and hence it is
an open question as to whether improved upper bounds exist in the presence of
master lists on one or both sides.
3.2.4 Generating stable matchings in smt
Given an instance I of smt, let SI denote the set of stable matchings in I. If I is an
instance of sm of size n, it is known that all stable matchings in I can be listed in
O(n2 + n|SI |) time and O(n2) space [41]. That is, the first stable matching can be
output in O(n2) time, and each subsequent stable matching can be output in O(n)
time. On the other hand, it is an open problem as to whether there is an e cient
algorithm for listing all stable matchings, given an instance I of smt of size n. By
e cient, we mean that the algorithm should have complexity O(p(n) + |SI |q(n)),
where p and q are polynomial functions.
A partial result along these lines was, however, provided by Scott [90]. He
showed that, given an smti instance I and a stable matching M in I, we can, in
O(L) time, find a stable matching M0 , M if one exists, or else report that M
is unique, where L is the total length of the men’s preference lists in I. On the
other hand, if I is an instance of smt in which the preference lists on both sides
are derived from two master lists of men and women, all the stable matchings in
I can be generated in O(n + s + |SI | log n) time, where s is the number of stable
pairs (i.e., man–woman pairs who belong to some stable matching) in I [51].
3.3 Stable Roommates problem
In this section we present open questions for sr, relating to the probability that a
given instance admits a stable matching (Section 3.3.1), two recently-introduced
notions of robustness (Section 3.3.2), and the complexity of finding the weighted
straight skeleton of a polygon (Section 3.3.3).
3.3.1 Solvability probability of random sr instances
A long-standing open problem, formulated as Problem 8 in Gusfield and Irving
[42], is the computation of pn, the probability that a random instance, chosen
uniformly from all possible sr instances of size n, admits a stable matching. Of
particular interest is the asymptotic behaviour of pn, as n grows large.
The best-known lower and upper bounds are due to Pittel [79], and Pittel and
Irving [80], respectively, and are as follows:
2e3/2p
⇡n
 pn 
p
e
2
Mertens [73] derived an explicit formula for pn. This formula is a sum over
cycle types of permutations of size n, and each term in the sum is an integral with
an exponential number of terms. Notice that, although the underlying ideas had
already been discussed by Pittel [79], the formula itself had not been published
before. Mertens [73] used code written in Mathematica to perform exact compu-
tations of pn up to n  12.
In addition to extensive simulations in [72] with the maximum value of n equal
20 000, ten years later Mertens [74] analysed the behaviour of Irving’s algorithm
for sr [48]. He showed that in random instances, Irving’s algorithm only looks at
O(
p
n) entries in each preference list, and so he was able to provide a modification
that has average time and space complexity O(n2/3). This enabled him to compute
pn for instances of size n = n02k for k = 0, . . . , kmax, and n0 2 {8, 10, 12, 14}, where
kmax is limited by the available memory. This helped computations for instances
more than 500 times larger than previously studied ones. The obtained results
support Mertens’ conjecture [74] that pn = ⇥
⇣
n 1/4
⌘
.
Still, these results do not shed enough light on the ultimate behavior of pn as n
becomes large. It seems that exact evaluation of pn for larger values of n is likely
to be infeasible without some unexpected new approach.
3.3.2 Robust matchings
Genc et al. [37] introduced a notion of robustness for sm which concerns the ca-
pability of a stable matching to be repaired at a small bounded cost in case some
pairs in a stable matching break up. Formally, an (a, b)-supermatch in an smi or sri
instance I is a stable matching such that if any a non-fixed stable pairs3 break up
3A stable pair is fixed if it belongs to every stable matching in I.
their assignments, it is possible to find another stable matching in I by changing
the partners of the agents involved in those a pairs and by also changing at most b
other pairs.
Genc et al. [39] showed that the problem of deciding if there exists a (1, b)-
supermatch is NP-complete in smi for any b   1, which also implies that this
problem is NP-hard in sri. However, for the more general case of (a, b)-super-
matches, it is not even known whether the problem belongs to NP. By contrast,
given a stable matching M in an sri instance, Genc et al. [38] gave a polynomial-
time algorithm to verify whether M is a (1, b)-supermatch. The algorithm uses a
deep knowledge of the structure of the set of all stable matchings, described by
the complete closed subsets of the reduced rotation poset of the given sri instance.
Genc et al. [38] also provided two metaheuristics for finding a (1, b)-super-
match for a given sri instance that minimises the value of b, however, the approx-
imability of this problem has not been studied theoretically.
Mai and Vazirani [63, 64] define robustness in a di↵erent way. Given an sm
instance I, letJ(I,D) be the set of instances that result after introducing one error
from a domain D. The domains of errors may be, for example:
(i) For any agent a, swap the positions of two adjacent agents in the preference
list of a.
(ii) For any agent a, shift a position of an agent in the preference list of a up-
wards (downwards).
(iii) For any agent a, arbitrarily permute the preference list of a.
Given a probability distribution for D, a robust stable matching is a matching that
is stable in I and has the highest probability of being stable after introducing one
error from D. A fully robust stable matching is a matching that is stable in I and
in each of the instances in J(I,D).
For a given instance of sm, Mai and Vazirani proposed polynomial-time algo-
rithms for finding a robust stable matching (for the domains defined by (ii) above)
[63] and for checking if there is a fully robust stable matching (for the domains
defined by (iii) above) [64]. Further, they proved that the set of all such matchings
forms a sublattice of the lattice of all stable matchings. They used this structure to
find a fully robust stable matching that maximises (or minimises) a given weight
function. As far as we are aware, robust stable matchings in sr have not been
studied previously.
3.3.3 The complexity of finding the weighted straight skeleton of a polygon
We complete our list of open problems with a seemingly unrelated problem from
geometry. Aichholzer et al. [8, 9] defined the straight skeleton of a polygon. It is
derived from shrinking the polygon by translating each of its edges at a fixed rate,
as the edges of the polygon are moved inwards parallel to themselves at a constant
speed, as illustrated in Figure 3. The vertices of the shrunk polygon trace angular
bisectors, calledwavefront edges, which build the straight skeleton of the polygon.
In a generalized setting, the speed of moving the edges can di↵er for each edge—
in this case we talk about a weighted straight skeleton. The (weighted) straight
of skeleton of a polygon can be used to construct a polygonal roof over a set of
walls [9], and even to solve certain origami design problems [33].
Figure 3: Constructing the straight skeleton of a polygon [46]. The first figure
indicates the shrinking of the polygon. The blue edges in the second figure are
the wavefront edges. The third figure illustrates how a polygonal roof can be
constructed based on the straight skeleton.
Detecting combinatorial changes in the input polygon as it shrinks is essential
when computing the straight skeleton of a polygon. Biedl et al. [18] computed the
weighted straight skeleton by utilising stable matchings in sr. At each wavefront
edge, two edges of the polygon meet, but when a wavefront collapses or splits, the
new wavefront edge will correspond to a di↵erent pair of polygon edges. Biedl
et al. [18] translated the problem of finding which polygon edge pairs will form a
wavefront edge into a planar matching problem, which is then further translated
into an instance of sr. Calculating a weighted straight skeleton can thus be re-
duced to computing a stable matching in the constructed sr instance, which is
guaranteed to admit one.
Biedl et al. [18] gave an upper bound on the complexity of finding the weighted
straight skeleton of a polygon in time O(N5), where N denotes the number of
vertices of the polygon. They conjectured that this running time can be improved.
A deeper insight into the structure of the underlying sr instance might lead to such
an improvement in the e ciency of the algorithm.
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